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Abstract 
With the recent upswing in research interest on the moral implications of disgust, there has 
been uncertainty about what kind of situations elicit moral disgust, and whether disgust is a 
rational or irrational player in moral decision making. We first outline the benefits of 
distinguishing between bodily violations (e.g., sexual taboos, such as pedophilia and incest) 
and non-bodily violations (e.g., deception or betrayal) when examining moral disgust. We 
review findings from our lab and others’ showing that, although many existing studies do not 
control for anger when studying disgust, disgust at non-bodily violations is often associated 
with anger and hard to separate from it, while bodily violations more consistently predict 
disgust independently of anger. Building on this distinction, we present further empirical 
evidence that moral disgust, in the context of bodily violations, is a relatively primitively 
appraised moral emotion compared to others such as anger, and also that it is less flexible and 
less prone to external justifications. Our review and results underscore the need to distinguish 
between the different consequences of moral emotions. 
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Bodily-Moral Disgust: What It Is, How It Is Different from Anger and Why It Is an 
Unreasoned Emotion 
 Individuals often express both anger and disgust in reaction to the same situation.  
This close association of anger and disgust, however, contradicts emotion research that treats 
them as two distinct basic emotions and emphasizes their very different behavioral outcomes, 
facial expressions, and physiological responses (Ekman, 1999).  This paradox casts a shadow 
over a recent surge in research on moral emotions inspired by theory in psychology and 
philosophy (e.g., Haidt, 2001; Prinz, 2007). While it is clear that anger and disgust are moral 
emotions that serve parallel functions and often co-occur, their distinct roles are less clear 
because they have often been studied singly rather than in contrast to each other.  
Additionally, previous research has focused on the situations or violations that give rise to 
anger and disgust, instead of investigating their unique consequences, which has been the 
primary aim of our research (Russell & Giner-Sorolla 2011a, b, c).  
To facilitate this comparison, we first propose a clearer look at disgust’s role in 
morality. We make a distinction between disgust expressed when moral codes related to the 
body are violated (bodily-moral disgust) and disgust expressed when other moral codes are 
violated (non-bodily moral disgust). By employing this distinction, this supports the central 
claim we wish to make about differences between disgust and anger: that disgust, compared 
to anger, is an unreasoning moral emotion. Specifically, we will review findings in others’ 
research and our own (e.g., Björklund, Haidt, & Murphy, 2000; Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 
2007; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011a, b, c; Simpson, Carter, Anthony, & Overton, 2006), 
showing that moral disgust is “unreasoning” and inflexible principally when bodily norms are 
violated.  Outside of this context, moral disgust appears to be more closely co-activated with 
anger, and shares many of moral anger’s characteristics, which are more regulated by context 
and reasoning.  
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We will review evidence that disgust, in the context of bodily-moral violations, differs 
from other emotions of moral condemnation, particularly anger, in three different senses of 
the word “unreasoning.” First, bodily-moral disgust is weakly associated with situational 
appraisals, such as whether or not a behavior is harmful or justified. Instead, it tends to be 
based on associations with a category of object or act; certain objects are just disgusting. 
Second, bodily-moral disgust is relatively insensitive to context, both in thoughts and 
behaviors, therefore, disgust is less likely to change from varying contexts. Third, bodily-
moral disgust is less likely to be justified with external reasons, instead, persons often use 
their feelings of disgust as a tautological justification. These unreasoning traits can make 
disgust a problematic socio-moral emotion for a liberal society because it ignores factors that 
are important to judgments of fairness, such as intentionality, harm, and justifiability.  
Anger and Disgust 
The two main families of moral emotions include the other-condemning emotions 
contempt, anger, and disgust, and the self-conscious emotions shame, embarrassment, and 
guilt (Haidt, 2003; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999). According to the CAD moral 
emotion triad hypothesis (Rozin et al., 1999), three moral emotions (contempt, anger, disgust) 
are associated with violations of three different moral codes (community, autonomy, divinity) 
respectively. Across four experiments these researchers found that anger is associated with 
violations of autonomy; meaning the rights of individuals (e.g., physical harm); disgust with 
violations of divinity; meaning the religious and natural order (e.g., non-normative sexual 
acts), and contempt with violations of community; meaning the duties and obligations of a 
social role (e.g., showing disrespect to authority). However, research on contempt has 
highlighted methodological and theoretical ambiguities. In particular, contempt has proven 
elusive to measure verbally (Matsumoto & Ekman, 2004) and some scholars of moral 
emotions argue that contempt is actually a blend of anger and disgust (Prinz, 2007). As a 
5 
 
result, contempt does not often figure in research on moral emotions. To simplify matters, we 
will focus on anger and disgust as other-condemning emotions, in order to clearly define 
what moral disgust is; its unique cognitive and behavioral characteristics, and consequences.  
Despite their apparent overlap, a vast amount of research has found that individuals’ 
feelings of anger and disgust can be reliably distinguished. Past research has found different 
physiological responses for anger and disgust (Ekman, Levenson, & Friesen, 1983; 
Levenson, 1992; Levenson & Ekman, 2002): anger is associated with increased heart rate and 
blood pressure, and disgust with lower heart rate (see also Stark, Walter, Schienle, & Vaitl, 
2005). Ekman’s (1999) research has also identified anger and disgust as two separate basic 
emotions based on their different facial expressions. Anger and disgust have different action 
tendencies: anger promotes hostile approach, while disgust promotes withdrawal tendencies 
(e.g., Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007; Lazarus, 1999; we present a more detailed review in 
the section “Disgust: Inflexibility of Behaviors”). Finally, a recent meta-analysis of the brain 
regions that are activated by specific emotion stimuli revealed the greatest consistent 
activation in the left inferior frontal gyrus for anger, and in the insula for disgust (Vytal & 
Hamann, 2010), thus, there are some reliable differences even though the brain regions for 
emotions of moral condemnation sometimes overlap. The present paper will go beyond these 
known differences, and show that even though they frequently occur together, anger and 
disgust can be reliably distinguished in moral contexts by examining their characteristics, 
such as reasoning and flexibility. 
Similar to Keltner and Haidt (2001), we subscribe to a multi-functional view of 
emotions in which the same emotion (e.g., disgust or anger) can be elicited by different 
cognitive appraisals or sensory material, according to the context. According to this view, 
each of these uses of emotion represents an adaptation of biological or cultural evolution to a 
specific purpose, so that the purposes a single emotion can serve can thus end up being quite 
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different. This view can be contrasted with the assumption of many appraisal theories that 
each emotion corresponds to a single, definite set of cognitive appraisals (Lazarus, 1991; 
Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Particularly with moral 
emotions such as anger and guilt, there is instead evidence that many different cognitive 
elements are each sufficient to trigger an emotion. For example, anger can arise in response 
to physical discomfort, goal blockage, unfairness, or hostile intent (Berkowitz & Harmon-
Jones, 2004; Kuppens et al., 2003, 2007). Different appraisals accompany emotions judged as 
“reasonable” versus “unreasonable”, with reasonable instances being defined as occasions in 
which emotions are experienced with good reason (Parkinson, 1999). Disgust, too, arises 
from numerous elicitors that serve different functions (Keltner & Haidt, 2001; Rozin, Haidt, 
& McCauley, 2008). At least three of these elicitors, corresponding to core disgust, sexual 
disgust, and moral disgust, show consistent and distinct  patterns of variation between 
individuals (Tybur, Lieberman, & Griskevicius, 2009).   
Within these different contexts, an emotion (e.g., disgust) can involve the same set of 
specific “hot” feelings, as shown by expressive actions and facial signals, verbal emotion 
terms, and physiological reactions. However, the stimuli or appraisals that elicit the emotion 
in different contexts will be different, and so might the action tendencies emerging from the 
emotion (e.g., anger can lead to attack or reconciliation depending on the context). According 
to this view, “moral disgust” is not a separate emotion from core disgust, but arises from 
moral considerations and informs moral judgments. In moral contexts, disgust and anger 
often are found together, as both are negative, other-condemning emotions (Haidt, 2003). But 
to the extent that disgust can be distinguished from anger in contexts where morality involves 
the body, the preponderance of evidence suggests that disgust responds to violation of norms 
about the body. In other moral contexts, the characteristics of disgust and anger may be 
harder to distinguish. 
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Defining Moral Disgust 
Most theories of disgust acknowledge that it can be elicited by different moral 
situations, with some going on to suggest an evolutionary sequence to the different disgust 
elicitors. For example, Rozin et al. (2008) argue that the most basic tendency underlying 
disgust is the avoidance of putting contaminating or offensive objects in the mouth, which is 
seen in animals such as monkeys and cats (e.g., Jones, 2007). Miller (1997) also makes this 
observation but labels this sort of proto-disgust “distaste” instead. This response has evolved 
into an emotion that can be more properly labeled “disgust,” with a set of feelings (such as a 
sense of contagion) that more generally guards against biological impurities and diseases. 
This tendency, with its associated elicitors, has been labeled as “core disgust” (Rozin et al., 
2008). Finally, in this argument, disgust has evolved in human cultures to respond to socio-
moral elicitors of disgust such as immoral acts or low-status people. Socio-moral disgust is 
then used as a form of social control.  
However, this last step is more controversial: Whereas there is little question that 
dung, open wounds, and other core elicitors activate the disgust emotion, some research calls 
into question whether all higher-level socio-moral elicitors of disgust call forth the exact 
same emotion. For example, Simpson et al. (2006) had participants view pictures that had 
elements of core disgust elicitors, such as bodily fluids, or socio-moral disgust elicitors, such 
as news media depictions of racism. These researchers found that socio-moral disgust 
elicitors, unlike core disgust elicitors, shared a great deal of variance with feelings of anger. 
This raises the question of whether the “disgust” reported in socio-moral contexts has more to 
do with anger than with basic disgust, or at the very least represents a blend of the two. They 
also found differences between elicitors in how verbal reports of disgust responded over time. 
Disgust at core elicitors weakened over time, while disgust at socio-moral elicitors 
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intensified.  This raises another question: whether moral contexts might lead to a more 
cognitively elaborated form of disgust than non-moral ones.  
 Four distinct arguments about the role of disgust in moral condemnation exist in the 
literature. One argument holds disgust to be a sovereign emotion of condemnation, one that is 
active in many kinds of socio-moral disapproval, ranging from sexual mores to cheating, 
dishonesty, and exploitation (e.g., Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, & Imada, 1997; Hutcherson & 
Gross, 2011). We will call this the general morality position. A more specific hypothesis, as 
proposed by the CAD and moral foundation theories, is that disgust is used to regulate 
contamination of the body and soul (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007; 
Haidt & Joseph, 2007; Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009, Rozin et al., 1999), which 
we label the purity position. A third argument claims that the apparent involvement of disgust 
in moral disapproval is only a by-product of the co-activation of terms for disgust and anger; 
anger is truly the moral emotion and disgust language is just a metaphor for anger (e.g., 
Bloom, 2004; Nabi, 2002). This stance we will call metaphorical use position. Evidence from 
our own and others’ research (e.g., Björklund, Haidt, & Murphy, 2000; Gutierrez & Giner-
Sorolla, 2007; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011a, b, c; Simpson et al., 2006), however, leads us 
to propose a distinction between different moral situations, resulting in a fourth, bodily norm 
position. We hold that disgust is most clearly a separate moral emotion from anger when felt 
in response to bodily-moral violations - that is, acts that offend categorical moral norms about 
what should or should not be done with the body and its products regardless of harm or 
justice, such as taboos against certain expressions of sexuality or eating certain foods. 
However, for violations that offend socio-moral norms about fairness, harm, or rights, the 
“disgust” reported tends to co-occur with anger, and is not as unreasoning as bodily-moral 
disgust is. Before providing empirical support for our distinction we will outline the general 
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morality, purity, and the metaphorical use hypotheses in more detail. In Table 1 we 
summarize the published empirical evidence as of June 2011 bearing on each position.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Although there seems to be a great deal of evidence in support of positions other than 
the bodily norm hypothesis, we will argue that many of these studies do not present decisive 
tests in the face of anger and disgust’s common status as high-arousal emotions of moral 
condemnation. A decisive test in this instance would involve three things: a) directly 
measuring both disgust and anger as distinct states by verbal self-reports, facial measures of 
endorsements, or characteristic physiological, and neurological signatures, while avoiding 
confounding factors such as only adding the term “moral” to one emotion term but not 
another (necessary for comparing all positions),  b) directly comparing responses to bodily 
and non-bodily moral violations (necessary for distinguishing general morality and bodily 
norm), and c) including at least some situations related to purity that do not violate 
categorical norms about the body  (necessary to separate purity and bodily norm).  
General morality.  Some researchers take the view that disgust is not specific to 
moral judgments involving the body, attaching it to immoral acts in general, or at least 
particularly bad ones. For example, as outlined previously, Rozin, Haidt, and McCauley 
(1993) argue that disgust can be elicited when a behavior violates a society’s norms in a way 
that shows a particularly inhuman or despicable character, demonstrating that the person who 
committed the violation does not fit in with the rest of society.  To support this claim, the 
authors reported that in previous research, when North American participants were asked to 
list things that they thought were disgusting, they listed moral violations that were both 
sexual and non-sexual in nature. These authors did note that in the context of non-sexual 
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moral violations the word “disgusting” may have been used metaphorically, pointing to the 
statistical separateness of socio-moral disgust items in the development of the Disgust Scale 
(Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994). In later writings, the same authors (Rozin, Haidt, & 
McCauley, 2000) became more favorable to the general morality position, referring to a 
qualitative analysis of language in different countries which showed a more general tendency 
to apply “disgust” to non-sexual violations (Haidt et al., 1997). At the same time, it might be 
that this use of language itself represents a universally accessible metaphor, a confusion 
between disgust and anger terms, or co-activation of disgust with anger. Although one set of 
studies has compared disgust to anger and contempt in truly socio-moral contexts, the results 
are somewhat compromised by an insistence on qualifying disgust and no other emotion term 
with the “moral” adjective in order to separate it from the core-disgust term “grossed out” 
(Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). Although, for example, that article’s Experiment 1 found that 
“moral disgust” was the most frequently elicited emotion for several kinds of moral violation, 
it is not clear to what extent participants were responding to the “disgust” part or the “moral” 
part of that item. 
Moreover, while most experiments have taken care to control for the possibility that 
disgust is related to immoral behavior through activation of general negative affect (e.g., 
Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Schnall, Haidt, Clore, 
& Jordan, 2008), some have not (e.g., Danovitch & Bloom, 2009; Jones & Fitness, 2008; 
Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). Even when controlling for general negative affect, much of the 
recent evidence for disgust as a response to non-bodily moral violations has also not gone the 
full length to distinguish anger and disgust, or from other high-arousal negative states (as 
opposed to, say, sadness, which is low in arousal). 
For example, Jones and Fitness (2008) argued that individuals are physically repulsed 
by moral transgressors that use deception and abuse their power. Therefore, according to this 
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definition, an individual or group can be deemed as disgusting if they have engaged in a 
despicable behavior. In Experiment 1 it was found that participants were more likely to 
produce disgust and washing related words after reading descriptions about criminal 
behaviors, which shows heightened accessibility of disgust related concepts. However, these 
researchers did not measure whether participants experienced and activated anger, only 
disgust.  
In the next two studies Jones and Fitness (2008) examined whether disgust sensitivity 
was associated with the need to avoid coming into contact with criminals, for example, by 
being biased toward conviction. Specifically, the authors thought that people would display 
higher conviction rates because they want criminals to be kept out of society. Indeed, in 
Study 2 both trait anger and trait vengefulness were measured because the authors asserted 
that they were competing positions to their own hypothesis. However, the regression analyses 
that were carried out to test their hypothesis simultaneously entered trait anger and 
vengefulness into the model; it was found that trait vengefulness was correlated with trait 
anger but not disgust sensitivity. This may then explain why no relationship was found 
between trait anger and conviction rates; vengefulness may have accounted for the unique 
variance contribution of trait anger to judgments, since the desire to take revenge or seek 
justice is strongly tied with feelings of anger (e.g., Averill, 1983; Goldberg, Lerner, & 
Tetlock, 1999). What these studies did show convincingly is that individual tendencies to 
convict criminals may draw on both punitive (represented by anger or its related construct, 
vengefulness) and exclusionary (represented by disgust) tendencies. 
Further support for the general morality position comes from research that assessed 
objective facial expressions of disgust independently of language. Chapman, Kin, Susskind 
and Anderson (2009) found that expressions of disgust were displayed, based on both 
subjective (self-report) and objective (facial expression) measures, not only toward distasteful 
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and physically disgusting stimuli, but also toward situations that would be considered to elicit 
moral disgust. For example, the authors found that participants reported feelings of disgust, 
and displayed the corresponding facial expressions, when they were given unfairly low offers 
in an economic game.  
However, as Rozin, Haidt, and Fincher (2009) suggest in their commentary on the 
Chapman et al. article, the unfair offer may have only elicited the disgust word, which then 
activates the disgust face and appropriate physiological responses. They also noted that the 
facial measurement used in Chapman et al. is confounded with anger. Specifically, they 
measured only the levator labii, which has been found to be displayed in conjunction with 
moral disgust, more so than other forms of disgust (e.g., distaste, core disgust), though, it is 
also linked with anger and contempt (Rozin, Lowery, & Ebert, 1994). Activity in the 
corrugator (brow wrinkle), for example, occurs in anger but not disgust, providing one way to 
distinguish the emotions. Notably, in Chapman et al. self-reported anger also increased as the 
offers became more unfair. So, in this paradigm we see the commonly observed co-activation 
of anger and disgust, but it is not clear which of these is related to judgments of unfairness, 
which were not measured directly. Therefore, future research should endeavor to more 
carefully tease apart anger and disgust in response to non-bodily moral violations, such as 
unfair offers.  
Similar problems exist in the research of Danovitch and Bloom (2009), in which 
children were asked whether disgust faces and words corresponded to a variety of different 
moral situations, including being mean, cheating, and stealing. However, these studies never 
asked children about faces and words corresponding to anger, or indeed to any negative 
comparison emotion, and were based on a forced choice design. Perhaps, then, the matching 
of disgust facial expressions to violations of non-bodily norms simply reflects a general 
negative evaluation, or confusion among the emotion referred to by the faces. In fact, Widen 
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and J. A. Russell (2008) discovered this confusion among young children; with a majority of 
them (and 25% of adults) incorrectly identifying disgusted faces as reflecting fear or anger. 
Thus, it would have been useful if this research distinguished moral disgust from other 
negative emotions.   
In support of the general morality position, across several studies there is evidence 
that incidental feelings of physical disgust can make moral judgments more severe, including 
both bodily and non-bodily moral violations.  (e.g., Eskine, Kacinik, & Prinz, 2011; Schnall, 
Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). Importantly, this area of research 
has found consistent results using a wide variety of incidental manipulation techniques, such 
as smells, taste, videos, and hypnosis. Until now, this research has only compared disgust to 
the negative, non-moral emotion of sadness (e.g., Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009, 
Study 2; Lerner, Small, & Loewenstein, 2004; Schnall et al., 2008).  However, it would be 
useful to see whether incidental feelings of anger or contempt influence individuals’ moral 
judgments distinct from disgust (as suggested in Schnall et al., 2008), since both anger and 
contempt are morally condemning emotions.  
Overall, much of the research supporting the general morality hypothesis of disgust to 
this point has left open the possibility that anger, rather than disgust, forms part of negative 
reactions to non-bodily moral violations. Verbal reports of disgust, as we will see in the 
metaphorical use section, may be used metaphorically to express anger; without angry faces 
as an alternative, identification of disgusted faces may reflect confusion between expressions 
or a general high-arousal negativity. Finally, published research measuring participants’ own 
facial expressions has also not yet measured anger in the same way as disgust, considered it 
as an alternative explanation for moral reactions, or used an unambiguously moral context.  
Purity. The CAD and Moral Foundations theories aim to categorize domains of moral 
concerns (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2007; 
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Horberg et al. 2009; Rozin et al., 1999), and have argued that certain emotions are associated 
with the different moral domains. Specifically, it has been hypothesized and supported that 
divinity violations, or the related concept of purity violations in the Moral Foundations theory 
are associated with disgust (Horberg et al., 2009; Rozin et al., 1999). These studies have 
demonstrated that participants feel disgust as the primary emotion toward purity violations, 
but not harm, injustice, and community violations. Thus, it has been shown that when 
participants are presented with scenarios that depict purity violations that disgust is an 
integral emotion towards these violations. Additionally, it has been found that disgust can 
distinctively heighten moral judgments of purity violations (Horberg et al., 2009), which is 
unique from other findings that show core disgust to influence both purity and non-purity 
violations (such as Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005).  
Research on the purity hypothesis has successfully shown on many occasions that 
disgust is associated with purity violations that seem directly connected to the body, by using 
scenarios that described non-normative sexual acts (e.g., incest) or eating behaviors (e.g., 
eating a pet dog; Rozin et al., 1999). Often, scenarios that have been used to elicit so-called 
moral disgust have merely incorporated objects that are just physically disgusting (e.g., 
touching a dead corpse; Rozin et al., 1999). However, it is also argued that purity violations 
can include quite abstract concerns about contamination, as demonstrated by the following 
definition: 
The purity domain encompasses the belief that people ought to be, in their bodies and 
minds, clean, chaste, self-restrained, and spiritually pure and should strive to live in a 
sacred, divine way (which does not necessarily require belief in deity). (Horberg et 
al., 2009, p. 964) 
Therefore, as demonstrated by this definition, purity violations should encompass concerns 
about being mentally or spiritually impure. However, to date very little research has 
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attempted to demonstrate this non-bodily aspect as an influence on disgust. To our 
knowledge, Horberg et al. (2009) represents the only research that includes mild purity 
violations that are not directly connected with norms about the body (e.g., buying music with 
sexually explicit lyrics or purposefully wearing unmatched clothing), to test the link between 
disgust and this aspect of purity. In a pre-test the researchers found that their violations were 
a good fit for their definition of the purity domain. However, in their Experiments 2 and 3 
they did not measure integral emotions, such as anger and disgust, only moral judgment and 
punishment. It would have been useful to measure emotions in order to determine if 
participants found the violations to be disgusting, not just wrong. Additionally, to our 
knowledge, no research has assessed whether mental or spiritual purity violations, or any 
other types of purity violation not having to do with the body, are seen as contaminating. 
In summary, the purity hypothesis has been successful in showing that disgust is 
associated with concrete, categorical violations of bodily norms. However, it is debatable 
whether disgust can arise from other abstract contamination threats that are not associated 
with the physical body.  This also makes it questionable whether the unique characteristics of 
disgust according to our unreasoning disgust hypothesis will be demonstrated in the context 
of mental or spiritual purity violations.  
Metaphorical use. As we have seen in the previous sections, a large amount of 
research on moral disgust rests on self-reports and inductions using emotion terms. This 
evidence - if not the evidence using facial measures or facial expression endorsement - can be 
criticized under the hypothesis that people who use “disgusted” to express moral disapproval 
use it as a metaphor for a state more akin to anger. Indeed, semantic studies of the emotion 
lexicon have shown an overlap of anger and disgust terms -at least in the English language - 
which makes it difficult to establish anger and disgust’s unique and shared characteristics on 
a purely verbal basis. Reports of “anger” and “disgust” are often highly correlated and used 
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interchangeably (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989; J. A. Russell & Fehr, 1994; Shaver, 
Schwartz, Kirson, & O'Connor, 1987). For example, Shaver et al. (1987) used hierarchal 
cluster analysis in order to distinguish English emotion terms and found distinct emotion 
categories. From this analysis, disgust was considered to be a subtype of anger. Focusing on 
anger specifically, J. A. Russell and Fehr (1994) found that disgust appeared to be a 
subcategory of anger using many different methods (e.g., free-listing, prototypicality ratings, 
and reaction times). Therefore, across many different methods, a close relationship between 
disgust and anger words has emerged, pointing to the necessity of using multiple measures, 
such as facial expressions and physiological measures, in order to overcome the shortcomings 
of assessing emotions through semantic terms exclusively.  
Additionally, research on feelings of anger and disgust toward social groups has 
tended to rely on verbal labels; intergroup emotions studies have been particularly susceptible 
to semantic confusion between anger and disgust. Group-based emotion models that propose 
specific links between perceived traits of groups and emotions felt toward them tend not to 
draw a sharp distinction between anger and disgust. For example, in Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, and 
Xu’s (2002) stereotype content model, it is predicted that both anger and disgust are reserved 
for outgroups that are perceived to be low in competence and warmth (e.g., homeless 
persons). Groups that belong to this quadrant are thought to have negative intentions towards 
the rest of society, and are perceived to be free-loaders. Empirical work on intergroup 
emotions has also tended to focus on just one of those emotions, usually anger (e.g., Rydell et 
al., 2008; Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, 2004). When the two emotions are explicitly compared, 
it has been difficult to find unique predictors for them. Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) tested a 
socio-functional account of group-based emotions, in which it was possible to map 
relationships between specific emotions and the threats posed by different social groups. 
These researchers found that disgust could be elicited by both disease and value threats – 
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corresponding to the proposed core and moral forms of disgust. However, anger was also 
found to be elicited by these threats. In fact, the model and findings allow anger to be elicited 
by every threat. Thus, this sociofunctional theory of group emotions also shows situations in 
which disgust and anger can be confused, both arising from the same appraisal.  
From this overlap of anger and disgust, some researchers have argued that “disgust” 
which arises in response to moral offenses is only a metaphorical use of disgust language to 
convey the true emotion of anger (Bloom, 2004; Nabi, 2002). This proposal contrasts with 
previous findings which clearly indicate that core anger and disgust can be meaningfully 
distinguished by their physiological responses, facial expressions, and behavioral tendencies 
(e.g., Ekman, 1999). Within Nabi’s (2002) research participants were asked to write about 
situations that made them feel “angry,” “disgust,” “disgusted,” “revulsion,” and “grossed-
out”. When asked to do so for the words “disgust” or “disgusted” participants described 
situations such as offensive actions and cheating behaviors, and these same themes were also 
frequently given for anger trigger words. However, the slang term “grossed-out” was more 
likely to be used when describing situations that capture the theoretical construct of core 
disgust but not anger, such as blood or vomit themes. In this research the only type of bodily 
violation that was generated as a topic or theme were inappropriate sexual acts, and were 
mainly given to the trigger words of “disgusted” and “repulsed.”  While these results are 
suggestive, and support the general finding that socio-moral violations tend to elicit both 
anger and disgust, they do not conclusively prove that the use of the “disgust” label for socio-
moral violations occurs in the absence of other distinctive indicators of disgust. Within the 
next section we argue that there are some moral contexts that seem to elicit disgust, more so 
than anger, as represented by its unique characteristics.  
 Bodily norm. In contrast to the preceding positions, we argue that in the moral realm, 
disgust does seem to have a function separate from anger as demonstrated by disgust’s unique 
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characteristics and consequences, but this function is primarily focused on governing 
categorical norms regarding the body. This includes norms against immoral sex and eating 
which are based entirely on the nature of the sex act or the food eaten. Norms against 
bestiality, cannibalism, eating morally protected animals (such as dogs or horses), incest or 
pedophilia, are some examples of the type of violations that may elicit disgust. Additionally, 
it seems as if there is usually a strong consensus within a given culture that these violations 
are wrong and disgusting.  
On the other hand, norms about the body that are not completely defined by what the 
participants or acts are, but rather by ideas of harm, consent, contractual agreement, and 
rights, will be more likely to be seen with anger independently from disgust. Hitting someone 
in the nose without reason, for example, may involve the body, but it is seen as wrong 
because it causes unjustified harm, not because it is taboo to touch one’s fist to another 
person’s nose. More generally, when “disgust” terms are used to condemn any kind of action 
that do not involve violation of categorical bodily norms, this usage is more closely linked to 
the semantic use of anger terms (Gutierrez, Giner-Sorolla, & Vasiljevic, 2012). Of course, 
some violations, such as sex with children, are both categorically abnormal - creating disgust 
- and harmful to a person and his or her rights - creating anger. In these cases, both disgust 
and anger will be expressed, but levels of disgust should also vary independently of anger, 
because there is a bodily-norm basis for moral disgust.  
Prior research has made it difficult to distinguish moral anger and moral disgust 
because they have used scenarios that can trigger responses of both disgust and anger.  Also, 
some of the scenarios that have been used to elicit so-called moral disgust are more likely to 
simply elicit physical disgust.  For example, in Rozin et al.’s (1999) research one scenario 
that was used to capture moral disgust, and most highly rated as an example of disgust, was 
“eating rotten meat.” Frequently these violations were deemed to be non-moral by 
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participants. On the other hand, someone having an incestuous relationship was considered to 
be morally disgusting, however, from the description used in their research, people may have 
made assumptions about harm and lack of consent (e.g., intergenerational incest), which 
makes it likely that anger was elicited as well, compared to more carefully worded scenarios 
of consensual sibling incest used in Björklund, Haidt, and Murphy (2000). Within Björklund 
et al.’s (2000) research the incest scenario clearly identified that no harm was caused, 
whether physical or mental, and that the two individuals consented to the sexual act. In 
comparison, within Rozin et al.’s (1999) research a very minimalistic scenario was used, 
simply stating that a person has an incestuous relationship.  Therefore, this research suggests 
the usefulness of separating the actual bodily norm from other factors, such as harm and 
consent, that may also elicit anger.  
The benefit of using the bodily norm distinction is supported by the overlap that has 
been found between moral anger and non-bodily moral disgust in Simpson et al.’s (2006) 
research. Core disgust elicitors evoked verbal disgust reactions that were not correlated with 
anger, but “socio-moral disgust” elicitors were highly correlated with anger. Specifically, 
when a regression analysis was carried out entering self-reported measures of fear and 
sadness as predictors of self-reported disgust within the core disgust condition, anger was not 
included as a predictor because it did not correlate with the measure of disgust. It was found 
that this model could only account for 22% of the variance, and fear was the only significant 
predictor. Then, self-report measures of anger, fear, and sadness were entered as predictors of 
self-reported disgust within the socio-moral disgust condition. It was found that this model 
accounted for 67% of the variance, and anger was the only significant predictor. Only one of 
the eight pictures used to elicit socio-moral disgust in this research, a picture of sexual 
infidelity, involved the body, and even that violation involves deception, breach of trust, and 
violation of rights. All the other pictures depicted non-bodily violations, such as racism and 
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disloyalty. Perhaps if a picture depicted a sexual act that was morally disgusting but violated 
nobody’s rights, disgust would have been more strongly distinguished from anger in a moral 
context.  
Previous findings from neuroscience also support our assumption that it is useful to 
distinguish between bodily and non-bodily violations, in order to best capture anger and 
disgust’s unique capabilities. For example, there are differences in the brain systems that 
respond to sexual and non-sexual moral norms, as well as to anger and disgust (Moll et al., 
2005; Schaich Borg, Lieberman, & Kiehl, 2008). In Schaich Borg et al.’s (2008) research, 
pathogen disgust (similar to core disgust) and socio-moral disgust acts were rated as more 
disgusting than neutral behaviors. Also, within the socio-moral domain, sexual violations 
(e.g., having sexual relations with sister) were rated as more disgusting than non-sexual 
violations (e.g., killing your sister’s child). When looking at patterns in brain activation, it 
was found that similar regions were active when considering pathogen and socio-moral acts, 
however, differences were also found in the brain regions that were activated for sexual and 
non-sexual violations, despite having fairly equal ratings on self-reported moral wrongness. 
Some brain regions were uniquely activated in response to sibling incest (e.g., insula, anterior 
insula), while others were activated to a lesser extent for non-sexual moral violations as well 
(e.g., amygdala, left insula cluster) showing that these two types of moral acts are processed 
differently in the brain. Specifically, areas associated with disgust processing were most 
distinctively active for incest acts. Finally, the patterns of brain activation for pathogen acts 
were distinguishable from both of the moral categories.   
Physiological responses that are distinctly linked with core disgust have also been 
shown mainly in response to sexual norm violations, and not toward non-bodily norm 
violators, even moral violations that would be good candidates for non-bodily disgust (e.g., 
evil character, deceptive, and abusive acts). Royzman, Leeman, and Sabini (2008) found that 
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third party reactions toward sibling incest were accompanied by physical repulsion, in the 
form of nausea, gagging, and diminished appetite (oral inhibition) as identified by self-report 
measures. Importantly, these disgust related sensations were more common than anger or fear 
responses based on subjective ratings. The authors attributed these feelings of disgust to the 
cultural transmission that this type of behavior is inherently wrong and disgusting. In a pre-
test these researchers also found that a photo of Hitler led participants to report feelings of 
disgust that were related to the need to lash out, but their feelings of disgust were not related 
to oral inhibition. However, pictures of gore, body waste, and incest showed a reversed 
pattern, in that feelings of disgust were associated with oral inhibition but not to the need to 
lash out. So, the disgust elicited by a photo of Hitler was characterized more by feelings that 
were akin to anger and separate from disgust, while bodily-moral disgust at things like incest 
have more in common with more basic disgust elicitors. 
Evidence from individual difference measures of disgust proneness also implies that 
disgust toward bodily and non-bodily violations should be examined separately. The disgust 
sensitivity scale (DS) is a verbal scale measure that assesses the likelihood and strength with 
which individuals report they would feel disgust in response to different stimuli. When 
creating the original scale, it became apparent that socio-moral disgust is a distinct form of 
disgust (Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994). In the domain of socio-moral disgust it was found 
that only sexual violations (e.g., incest) correlated reliably with the total score. Conversely, 
non-bodily moral violations (e.g., stealing from a blind beggar) did not correlate reliably with 
the total score. These socio-moral violation items were removed from the scale, which in its 
final form includes 32 items and is comprised of 8 domains of disgust (labeled as food, 
animals, body products, body envelope violations, death, sex, hygiene, and sympathetic 
magic).  
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A second, recently validated disgust sensitivity measure acknowledges three 
functionally distinct categories of disgust: pathogen, sexual, and moral disgust (Tybur, 
Lieberman, & Griskevicius, 2009). The “pathogen disgust” items include acts that are 
physically disgusting (e.g., standing close to a person who has body odor).  While the “moral 
disgust” items correspond to non-bodily socio-moral disgust (e.g., forging someone’s 
signature on a legal document or stealing from a neighbor), the “sexual” items involve the 
violation of sexual norms (e.g., having anal sex with someone of the opposite sex or 
performing oral sex), corresponding to our bodily-moral disgust. Importantly, all of these 
scales rely on the verbal term “disgusting,” leaving open the possibility that the non-bodily 
items are described that way only as a synonym or metaphor for anger.  
Therefore, empirical research on disgust so far has suggested that it is helpful to 
examine bodily and non-bodily violations separately. However, this then leads to the direct 
question of what specific emotions are being expressed in reaction to non-bodily violations, 
and if these violations give rise to multiple emotions of moral condemnation. Research within 
our lab suggests that disgust in response to non-bodily violations is more related to anger than 
disgust in response to bodily-moral violations, even if it may not be completely explicable by 
the metaphorical use of “disgust” to mean “anger.” Our general finding is that non-bodily 
violations may appear to cause an increase in the use of the word “disgust,” its synonyms, 
and other expressions of disgust, but when anger is controlled for, this increase is greatly 
reduced (Giner-Sorolla, Bosson, Caswell, & Hettinger, in press ; Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 
2007; Gutierrez, Giner-Sorolla, & Vasiljevic, 2012; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011a). By 
contrast, bodily violations show an increase in reports of disgust even when anger is 
controlled for, and disgust in this context shows unique characteristics, such as inflexibility 
and lack of external justifications (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011b c).  
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To give one example, a recent study addressed the role of verbal expressions of anger 
in disgust emotion expressions. Gutierrez, Giner-Sorolla, and Vasiljevic (2012) presented 
participants in two studies with versions of the same scenario that either had a violation of 
rights or of a categorical bodily norm (for example, a young man either is pressured into a 
sexual relationship by his slightly older boss, or has a consensual relationship with a 70 year 
old female co-worker). Participants provided scaled verbal reports of disgust, including 
synonyms such as “sickened” and “repulsed”; similar verbal reports for anger, and 
endorsements of extremely angry and disgusted faces, rating how much the action made them 
feel with reference to a picture of each face. Across scenarios, when the story violated other 
individuals’ rights, verbal measures of disgust were predicted mainly by verbal measures of 
anger, and only to a smaller degree by the disgust face endorsement measure. The fact that 
this small influence of the disgust face was still significant, however, argues against a purely 
metaphorical interpretation of the use of the word “disgust”; even in a non-bodily context this 
word had some connection to another symbol of the disgust concept, a disgusted-looking 
face. However, when the story violated only a bodily norm, there was a much larger relation 
of the disgust face with the disgust words, and a corresponding reduction of anger words. 
Indeed, the still significant influence of anger words even in a context of bodily-moral disgust 
shows the strong semantic overlap between the anger and disgust concepts.  
We are open to the possibility that disgust, as a separate construct from anger, can 
arise from non-bodily concerns. For example, although they did not study moral situations as 
such, Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) found that disgust at social groups was related to concerns 
that groups possess different values, such as religious or political ideologies, from the 
ingroup or carry infectious diseases. Whether or not this justifies creating a special subclass 
of disgust depends, we believe, on one’s working definition of emotion. For instance, if the 
(English) language of emotions is taken as the basis for studying discrete emotions, then the 
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use of “disgust” vocabulary needs to be taken at face value. From that perspective there may 
be a case for a special sub-emotion of “non-bodily moral disgust” that is somewhat blended 
with the features of anger, just as, for example, people’s descriptions of anger at the self has 
been shown to correlate with and contain elements of guilt (Ellsworth & Tong, 2007). At the 
same time, there are also arguments for attempting to study the subjective meaning of 
discrete emotions in a way that is independent of language and can be applied across different 
languages and cultures - for example, through a universal semantic grammar (Wierzbicka, 
1992). Because non-bodily moral “disgust” appears to be bound up with ideas of unfairness, 
this makes it a very similar emotion to anger, semantically. 
All this drawing of distinctions is certainly important for encouraging clearer future 
research in the area. However, we have brought the issue up at length here ultimately because 
it helps us clarify findings about the special properties of disgust in socio-moral situations. 
Specifically, our hypothesis that disgust is a more unreasoning moral emotion than anger 
generally holds true only for bodily-moral contexts. In fact, it stands to reason that because 
disgust expressed at non-bodily violations has a great deal to do with anger, the differences 
between its cognitive properties and those of anger should be minimal. Our research is novel 
because it highlights the importance of examining the unique characteristics and 
consequences of anger and disgust, which moves beyond previous research that primarily 
examines the situations or moral violations that are associated with anger versus disgust.  
Within the next sections, we move from considering the content that elicits disgust 
versus anger, to the more abstract cognitive characteristics of these different kinds of 
emotion. Given the greater potential confusion between disgust and anger when the body is 
not involved in a moral violation, we will use “disgust” from this point on to refer to the kind 
of emotion elicited by core disgust and bodily-moral contexts. When it becomes necessary to 
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refer to verbal or other measures of moral disgust felt in non-bodily contexts, we will use the 
term “non-bodily moral disgust.” 
Disgust: Categorical Appraisals 
One key feature of bodily-moral disgust is that it is categorical. A person who 
committed a disgusting act is tainted in the eyes of others, without considering consequences, 
excuses or justifications for the act. The act is just disgusting, and by extension the person as 
well. On the other hand, for anger, the social context is more likely to be involved in 
generating the emotion beforehand and reasoning about it after the fact. In short, the 
cognitions surrounding core disgust and bodily-moral disgust are simple, basic, concrete, and 
hard to change with mere thought; the cognitions surrounding anger are more abstract, 
complex, and amenable to change by thought and reappraisal.  
Appraisal theory has been mostly successful in mapping specific relationships 
between different thoughts and the emotions that can follow from them (e.g., Lazarus, 1999; 
Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose 1996; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994; Smith & Ellsworth, 
1985). For example, pride arises from a person’s evaluation that he or she has done 
something good, while fear follows from thinking that a situation is threatening beyond one’s 
own coping potential. However, theorists who have tried to capture what kind of thoughts 
elicits disgust have struggled to do so. Many attempts to capture the cognitive origins of 
disgust in a single concept often result in near tautologies. For example, definitions of the 
appraisals that elicit disgust include evaluative terms such as “distasteful stimuli” (Ortony, 
Clore, & Collins, 1988) and “poisonous ideas” (Lazarus, 1991). What makes a stimulus 
distasteful or poisonous, however, is not always clear from these descriptions, and the very 
evaluative terms used can be hard to distinguish from the concept of disgust in the first place 
– “distaste,” for example, being a partial translation of the Latin word from which the term 
“disgust” derives. 
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More in-depth approaches to disgust, focusing on the single emotion outside of the 
scheme of appraisal theories, have concluded that disgust can be elicited by a variety of 
objects and actions (e.g., Rozin et al., 2008), due to its status as an emotion that may have 
been adapted over biological and cultural evolution for different purposes (Keltner & Haidt, 
2001).  As we have shown in the previous section, some researchers have proposed a general 
morality hypothesis (Rozin et al., 2008), or argued that disgust is elicited by despicable 
behaviors (Jones & Fitness, 2008). More specifically, Rozin et al. (1999) have argued that 
disgust is elicited when an act is deemed as polluting the body or soul. If there is a common 
cognitive theme to what creates disgust, it may be uncleanness. However, researchers have 
not distinguished to what extent appraisals of uncleanness represent constructive appraisals 
that evaluate situations against a goal of cleanness or purity, as opposed to non-constructive 
appraisals that simply associate objects and environments with disgust (Moors, 2010). Based 
on previous evidence, we think that disgust is particularly likely to arise from non-
constructive appraisals, meaning that disgust is elicited by prior associations between a 
stimulus and an evaluation. 
If we accept the concept of uncleanness as an appraisal for disgust, we have to 
recognize that ideas about uncleanness apply to a large number of category memberships 
which are socially learned, and have very little in common conceptually except for the tag of 
“unclean.” The disgusted reactions of others transmit the concept of uncleanness even when 
empirical observation speaks to the contrary. For instance, a freshly-scrubbed eight-year-old 
girl, by consensus of the boys on the playground, can be seen with disgust as carrying the 
dreaded disease of “cooties.” Rational appraisals of cleanliness also have a hard time 
convincing someone that a thing is not contaminated when it has been previously tarnished, 
or when it belongs to a class of things considered unclean, even if only by appearance. 
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Rozin, Millman, and Nemeroff (1986) have already demonstrated that it is nearly 
impossible to reverse object-based feelings of disgust with contextual information. Using 
various experimental methods, it was found that persons would engage in avoidance and 
purification behaviors when disgusting qualities had been transferred onto a previously 
neutral object. However, when asked to explain these behaviors persons admitted that they 
could not come up with reasons and could not deny that their behaviors were based on 
irrational thoughts. For example, they showed that sterilization could not change an 
individual’s likelihood of drinking a cup of juice that has come into contact with a plastic 
cockroach. Across a series of six studies the contaminating nature of disgust was also shown 
to influence consumer evaluations (Moralez & Fitszimons, 2007). It was found that products 
were evaluated less favorably when placed near a clean object with disgusting connotations 
in a shopping basket. It was also found that actual contact was not required and that the 
negative influence carried on over time. Thus, disgust has the ability to tarnish an individual’s 
thoughts about other objects even when there is no rational reason to do so.  
Because contextual factors seem to matter less in generating disgust, this suggests a 
lesser importance for a priori appraisals as well; at the very least, such appraisals seem to be 
simpler associations, what Moors (2010) calls “non-constructive” appraisals, rather than 
referring to a person’s goals, cognitive understanding, and context in a “constructive” way. 
Thus, some objects are just disgusting; they feel contagious and can superficially transfer 
their disgusting qualities to other objects, in absence of any rational situational appraisals.  
In comparison, researchers have been able to establish over decades of research a 
clear set of conceptual elicitors for anger. Research on personal anger has linked this emotion 
with goal blockage, other-blame, and unfairness (Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 
1996; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). In the moral realm, anger has been found to be a response to 
actual or symbolic harm (Rozin et al., 1999). Anger has also been associated with attributions 
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of responsibility and blame (Alicke, 2000; Goldberg, Lerner, & Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock et al., 
2007). While individual differences in anger elicitors have been studied (Kuppens et al., 
2003, 2004, 2007), this research only underscores the diversity and abundance of the 
appraisals that can set off anger. More to the point, there is a much more abstract and 
conceptual nature underlying most anger elicitors, from goal blockage to unfairness. Anger 
seems less tied to objects, and more tied to situations and relationships.  
Why have researchers been more successful in identifying abstract appraisals 
underlying anger in comparison to disgust? One possible answer is given by Ortony, Clore, 
and Collins’ (1988) theory of the cognitive structure of emotions. These authors defined 
disgust as an object-focused emotion, thus, disgust is a form of like or dislike toward an 
object, in the same category of emotions as love and hate. Although, as we have seen, disgust 
is felt toward a more specific subset of targets compared to mere dislike, this view still 
accords with our observations about disgust as a concrete emotion that is based on social 
learning of what objects are disgusting. In comparison, Ortony et al. (1988) see anger as more 
complex and potentially changeable, focused on the event and agent rather than the object of 
the emotion, thus, situational appraisals are fundamental to anger.  
Ortony et al.’s (1988) framework may help explain why, in judging socio-moral 
violations, the term “disgust” and its accompanying metaphors are sometimes used. For 
example, if you see someone as being an intentional agent in an event, then this is more likely 
to be anger (e.g., a crooked politician). In comparison, if the thought of the object makes one 
revolted, for example, the image of a human having sex with an animal, this is more likely to 
be true disgust. In fact, this distinction may also explain why non-bodily moral 
transgressions, like the politician’s cheating, are sometimes described using metaphors of 
disgust – “dirty,” “slimy”. If the politician’s transgressions are judged in a way that leads to 
anger, and then a further inference is made that he or she is a morally corrupt “thing”, as 
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often happens when thinking about disliked social groups (Boccato, Cortes, Demoulin, & 
Leyens, 2007; Harris & Fiske, 2006; Haslam, 2006), concepts related to disgust might spring 
up, coexisting, and blending with anger. However, the use of disgust concepts and vocabulary 
in this case would depend on having judged the politician according to standards of 
intentionality, harm, and so forth. This may explain why non-bodily moral “disgust” shares 
more variance with anger, and why some of the cognitive characteristics of anger also 
regulate the use of disgust vocabulary in these situations. 
Because disgust is an object-based emotion, it can be assumed that it should be easier 
to learn that objects are disgusting through associative processes rather than situational or 
goal-based appraisals. This ties in with disgust’s proposed original function as a disease 
avoidance mechanism. It is functional to have a disease-bearing object or person judged 
automatically, in a strong negative association that is learned quickly and relatively 
impervious to change because an unhealthy thing should be avoided no matter where one 
finds it (Oaten, Stevenson, & Case, 2009). It is impractical to have infectious things take on 
different values depending on the situation or one’s goals; it is always a bad idea to nose 
around vomit or dead bodies. This characteristic of disease-based disgust carries over to other 
adaptations of disgust that do not literally involve disease, including in the moral realm. On 
the other hand, when there is more overlap between anger and disgust in a moral judgment, 
this will then make it more likely that the situational appraisals that govern anger will become 
influential. 
Prior research supports the assumption that disgust is more likely to be based on 
associative processes rather than situational appraisals. Although few of these studies have 
explicitly compared disgust against anger, the evidence for the associative nature of disgust, 
at least, is strong. For example, physical disgust has been theoretically and empirically shown 
to underlie blood injection phobia (Olatunji, Lohr, Sawchuk, & Westendorf, 2005), which is 
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irrational, impulsive, and hard to regulate. These researchers found that both disgust and fear 
can be elicited through associative learning, in that an evaluative conditioning effect was 
found between pictures that capture fear and disgust and neutral facial expressions. 
Specifically, participants acquired fear and disgust responses toward previously neutral facial 
expressions. These evaluative conditioning effects were shown based on post-exposure 
ratings of these emotions, such that neutral facial expressions received higher ratings, for 
both disgust and fear, if they had been paired with pictorial stimuli. By using a similar 
methodology, it was also found that feelings of disgust, more so than fear, may facilitate the 
learning of blood phobia.  
 It has also been found that children know that some objects are disgusting, even 
though they do not have an understanding about abstract concepts of contagion and 
conservation (Stevenson, Oaten, Case, Repacholi, & Wagland, 2010). This evidence suggests 
that associative, object-based learning underlies the formation of disgust-based attitudes, and 
that the appraisal of contamination may be an effect, not a cause, of our sense of what is 
disgusting. Indeed, these researchers also found evidence that disgust may be socially 
transmitted to children through their parents’ facial expressions and behavioral avoidance 
when dealing with disgusting things.  
Research evidence on what best elicits disgust versus anger also supports our 
assumption about how objects and appraisals relate to anger and disgust. For example, 
researchers have attempted to validate the pictures from the International Affective Picture 
System (IAPS), which is a set of pictures that is commonly used to elicit general moods, and 
in some instances discrete emotions, (Bradley, Codispoti, Sabatinelli, & Lang, 2001; Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999). Mikels, Fredrickson, Larkin, Lindenberg, Maglio, and Reuter-
Lorenz (2005) asked participants to rate their specific emotions on seeing each IAPS picture. 
They found that none of the pictures uniquely elicited anger independently of any other 
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negative emotion. On the other hand, there were photographs that were found to elicit disgust 
and fear distinctively. These findings suggest that it is hard to bring out anger with a static 
picture, while the more concretely elicited, object-related emotions of disgust and fear can be 
easily brought out with a photograph of a gross or scary thing.  
Indeed, when examining the type of pictures that are used to elicit anger versus 
disgust, it is apparent that situational appraisals are intertwined with any image that elicits 
anger, while disgust is elicited by concrete elicitors that can stand independently of 
situational appraisals. For example, photos that have been used to elicit anger, such as a photo 
of a Ku Klux Klan member, or neo-Nazis (e.g., Harmon-Jones, 2007), rest on knowledge of 
historical context and symbols, and assume the viewer’s lack of sympathy for those groups. 
What these cues have in common is that they symbolize abstract elicitors of anger, such as 
the KKK’s association with violence and injustice. A symbol (e.g., in a map that uses a 
triangular arrangement of dots to stand for a ruin) is different from an icon (e.g., in a map that 
uses a picture of a broken Greek column to stand for a ruin); the symbol is not visually self-
evident but requires background knowledge to interpret (Saussure, 1983). For example, 
Catholics from southern Spain might instead associate the KKK’s pointed hood and eye holes 
with the traditional costume of religious penitents during Holy Week, leading to feelings of 
moral elevation rather than anger.  
 Even a picture directly showing violence - itself a relatively complex relational 
situation - will only elicit anger to the extent that viewers think the violence is unjustified. 
Pictures of violence are likely to also elicit sympathy for the victim or fear of violence, rather 
than just anger, as further consequences of their relational complexity. Lobbestael, Arntz, and 
Wiers (2008) also found support for this view by comparing four different methods of 
manipulating anger: film, stress interview, punishment, and harassment. It was found that all 
four methods produced similar levels of self-reported anger; however, film created the lowest 
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amount of physiological changes, while the manipulations that entailed direct contact, 
interview and direct social harassment, led to more physiological changes.  
In comparison to anger, disgust is more iconic. It is easy to find pictures of simple 
objects that will elicit disgust as a dominant response, where situational appraisals are less 
likely to be influential. For example, when viewing a picture of a dirty toilet it is less likely 
that the elicited disgust comes from thoughts about who has defiled the toilet and the current 
circumstances, because the photograph iconically rather than symbolically represents the 
filth. Even representations of filth sculpted from delicious food, such as the baby-shower 
stunt in which melted chocolate bars are served in clean disposable diapers, elicit disgust in 
line with their superficial appearance.  
Finally, the object-bound nature of disgust may be encoded in our very language, as 
we have found out by examining word frequency statistics. Emotions can be referred to as 
adjectives that ascribe an emotion-eliciting trait to an object (“He’s so lovable”) or 
alternatively, as verbs, nouns, and adjectives that put more emphasis on the subject of the 
feeling (“She feels a great love for beagles”; “I love him.”)  In order to examine differences 
in language, we used a lexical corpus based on United States English usage in texts and 
media (Subtlexus, n.d.) to see how frequently the following words were used: 
angry/anger/angering vs. disgust/disgusted/disgusting (noun/subject adjective/object 
adjective). To broaden our treatment, we also looked for parallel forms of the anger 
synonyms “infuriated” and “outraged” and of the disgust synonyms “sickened” and 
“repulsed”, entering these in the database as well. From this we received output on the word 
frequency per million words. 
 For anger words, the word angry was most commonly used (58.98), followed by 
anger (19.43), outraged (1.29), infuriated (0.14), and angering (0.08). In comparison, for 
disgust words, the word disgusting was most frequently used (26.61), followed by disgust 
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(2.76), disgusted (1.76), repulsed (0.80), and sickened (0.26). So, when speaking of disgust, 
people are more likely to use the adjective form that implies a link between emotion and an 
object. On the other hand, for anger, people are more likely to use an adjective (“angry”) 
referring to the subject of anger (the person feeling it), or a noun that refers to anger as an 
abstract state. 
 Cumulatively, the research presented suggests that disgust, more so than anger, is an 
emotion with strong associations to objects and relatively weak influences of context and 
situation. This then opens the question as to how disgust is elicited and transmitted to others.  
Empirical research has supported the assumption that disgust (moral and non-moral forms) 
must be learned, either through cultural transmission or personal experiences. Developmental 
evidence has indicated that even primary objects which elicit disgust are not deemed to be 
disgusting until after toilet training (Angyal, 1941). Specifically, children do not exhibit the 
disgust response to primary objects, such as feces and vomit, until about the ages of 5-7 years 
(Angyal, 1941; Rozin et al., 1993). In a recent study (Danovitch & Bloom, 2009), children 
were found to be more likely to label moral violations as disgusting, in comparison to neutral 
and non-physically disgusting scenarios, but less often than physically disgusting scenarios. 
Individual differences, and differences between verbal and facial responses, suggested that 
this effect was strongly influenced by social learning and participants’ exposure to the disgust 
response.  
Therefore, moral forms of disgust seem to be socially learned as well, but the 
strongest associations seem to build upon things that are tied to core disgust (e.g., bodily 
violations). For example, there appears to be a larger consensus that culturally taboo sexual 
behaviors are disgusting, compared to, for example, deceptive behaviors (Haidt et al., 1997). 
It has been suggested that in the moral realm it may be particularly relevant and useful for 
members of society to learn norms about the body because these norms can serve a disease 
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avoidance mechanism (Oaten, Stevenson, & Case, 2009). That is, being careful about what 
one eats and who one sleeps with might translate directly into being less susceptible to 
diseases transmitted in those ways. 
While disgust in its moral and non-moral forms is maintained by learned associations, 
moral disgust in turn also fuels beliefs about what is morally wrong. The difference between 
moral disgust and non-moral disgust is that moral disgust is usually supported by moral rules 
as well (Nichols, 2002), even though both forms share the same “hot feelings”. For example, 
individuals sometimes not only learn that certain sexual behaviors are disgusting, but go on to 
hold moralized beliefs about their wrongness. We believe that an additional feature of moral 
disgust compared to anger is that the rules supporting it are usually deontological: that is, 
they judge an action as right or wrong in and of itself, regardless of consequences or context. 
Attitudes about behaviors that are not moralized, but still based on disgust, may lead to less 
universal condemnation.  
For instance, the attitude that “What you do is disgusting, but just don’t let us see you 
doing it, then it’s fine” is an all too common view of sexual difference based on disgust, 
which is based on the presumed negative consequences for an easily disgusted community, 
rather than on an absolute moral law. In contrast, the attitude that “What you do is disgusting 
in the eyes of God” moralizes the act in a way that makes clear, through the metaphor of the 
omniscient and unsleeping divine eye, that it is wrong at all times and under any 
circumstances. This implies that differences in context (e.g., privately versus publicly carried 
out) cannot change the moral turpitude of these sexual behaviors. In moral disgust, the 
emotional association is bound with categorical social rules that something is intrinsically 
wrong.  
On the other hand, anger and other reactions to non-bodily violations can also arise 
from social learning but are more likely to take into consideration utilitarian concerns, even if 
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only as a post-hoc process (see Greene, 2007; Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007; Hauser, 
2006; Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin, & Mikhail, 2007). Nussbaum (2004) has argued that 
anger is more likely to encourage assessments of the situation because the core cognitive 
feature of anger is harm, which is an appraisal that often leads to or needs social justification 
to other individuals in a society. Therefore, when feeling anger, persons are more likely to 
take into account the context because its cognitive appraisals and re-appraisals encourage this 
type of assessment. While anger can also arise from violations of deontological rules (such as 
“Thou shalt not kill”), it is more likely that we will make exceptions to anger based on 
deontological rules and consider the consequences. For example, it can be assumed that 
individuals would be more likely to make an exception to their moral judgment of someone 
who had killed another person if they knew that they were protecting a loved one, or if 
someone was lacking the mental capacity. Certainly, there is a greater tendency to 
countenance killing or harming another person if by doing so a number of others would be 
saved (see Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, 
Darley, & Cohen, 2001).  
For moralized rules whose violation evokes disgust (e.g., incest), however, 
individuals are less likely to make exceptions based on consequences. This is evident from 
successful scenarios used in moral dumbfounding research (Björklund, Haidt & Murphy, 
2000), which examines individuals justifications for moral judgments in general. For 
example, this research eliminated negative consequences arising from an act of sibling incest, 
clearly indicating that both siblings consented and suffered no psychological or physical 
harm, and yet found that most participants held onto their beliefs that the incest was wrong on 
principle. A thought experiment of sorts in support of this point is offered by a recent satirical 
dialogue, which appeared on a popular comedy website, on the justifications offered for 
torture in the War on Terror (Parsons, 2009). The author offers a fictional account of a Senate 
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hearing in which the committee asks a military man whether he would torture a suspected 
terrorist to get information that would save a school full of children. After the officer answers 
”yes”, to general approval, one committee member asks him whether he would be willing to 
commit a number of sexual acts on the male terrorist, who has hypothetically shown his 
willingness to save the children in return for said favors. This scenario, quite plausibly, gets 
much more disapproval and repulsion from the conservative panelists and the officer. 
Although this dialogue satirizes American attitudes toward sex and violence, it also illustrates 
our point about disgust and anger. Beneficial consequences can ultimately justify harm, 
unfairness, and other moral violations that lead to anger, but bodily-moral violations that lead 
to disgust are less excusable on utilitarian grounds. 
In summary, the research findings we have reviewed indicate that disgust is object-
based and associatively learned, particularly in its basic and bodily-moral forms; 
constructive, situational appraisals have little influence on whether or not such disgust is 
elicited. In contrast, because anger is an event and agent-based emotion, it is more likely that 
situational appraisals will be influential at some point.  This is because such appraisals, e.g., 
harm and intentionality, are necessary for judgments important to anger. Within the next 
section we will argue that the cognitions that accompany moral anger and disgust impact their 
flexibility.  
Disgust: Inflexibility of Thoughts 
In contrast to the seeming inflexibility of disgust, Goldberg, Lerner, and Tetlock 
(1999) found specific evidence that anger can be affected by a conscious cognitive 
interpretation of the situation. These authors found that unresolved anger, from hearing about 
a case in which an accused criminal went free unjustly, led participants to make greater 
inferences of harm in subsequent unrelated judgments. However, if participants learned that 
justice had been served in the original case, this decreased individuals’ anger and attributions 
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of blame, also diminishing carry-over effects of anger. Based on this research it can be 
inferred that the cue of justice can decrease the anger experience, in other words, moral anger 
seems to have a goal that can be satisfied by hearing additional facts (cf. Maitner, Mackie, & 
Smith, 2006). Even more importantly, this research suggests that anger may not have the 
same contaminating effects as disgust, because carry-over effects of anger were eliminated 
once a goal had been reached. This phenomenon is more characteristic of an emotion that 
depends on constructive, goal-oriented appraisals than of one that depends on simple 
associations between object and emotion. 
In addition to goal-related cues, research evidence has indicated that other situational 
cues can influence the intensity of anger, the likelihood that anger will be experienced in the 
first place, or the actions that one is willing to engage in as a result of anger. For example, 
individuals’ perception of their group’s power and of its control over the situation influences 
whether or not they will feel angry on behalf of the group (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000).  
Anger is also more likely with greater closeness or intimacy to an interpersonal target, 
influencing the likelihood of experiencing anger as well as the intensity of one’s anger 
(Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Kuppens, Van Mechelen, & Meulders, 2004; Kuppens, Van-
Mechelen, Smits, De Boek, & Ceulemans, 2007; Weber, 2004). Gordijn, Yzerbyt, 
Wigboldus, and Dumont (2006) have found that manipulating whether or not a participant 
could relate to the victim or perpetrator influenced their judgments, intensity of anger and 
subsequent behaviors, in reaction to a scenario that described a harmful behavior that one 
group inflicted on another group. Specifically, when persons were reminded of their 
similarities to the victims, this increased their judgments of unfairness, increased their anger 
and made it more likely that they would take action toward the perpetrator. When 
participants’ similarities to the perpetrator were made salient, this reversed the pattern of 
relationships; they were less likely to perceive the harmful behavior as being wrong and were 
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less likely to feel anger. Thus, specific situational cues have been identified that appear to 
influence the likelihood of experiencing anger in the first place and the intensity of one’s 
anger.  
 On the other hand, as we have seen, disgust appears to be focused on learned 
associations, and situational factors have a harder time modifying the experience of disgust. 
One functional reason proposed for the apparent insensitivity of disgust is a greater 
evolutionary cost of missing cues to infection compared to avoiding false alarms (Oaten, 
Stevenson, & Case, 2009). Thus, predictive signals of disease or contagion may be benign, 
however, persons will still avoid others who show signs of disease because it is better, and 
fairly low in cost, to act on a false alarm than risk exposure to disease. For example, Park, 
Faulkner, and Schaller (2003) have found that people automatically react with disgust and 
avoidance to persons with a disability, even if the individuals cannot help their disability 
and/or if they are not contagious. Therefore, even though persons with disabilities are morally 
and medically harmless, others still automatically react with revulsion and avoidance.  
Further establishing anger’s relatively greater flexibility, we have found that anger is 
more likely than disgust to respond to specific contextual cues that are appropriate for justice 
(Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011a). In a story describing meat eating, we orthogonally 
manipulated 1) taboo: whether the action constituted cannibalism, by having the cells in 
question come either from lamb, or from a human; 2) harm: whether the scientist either ate 
the meat personally, or fed it to friends telling them it was beef; 3) intent: whether the 
scientist knew the true nature of the meat, or believed it to be beef due to someone else’s 
error.  Participants then rated their anger and disgust as well as various appraisals, including 
their moral judgment. Analyzing the effects of anger and disgust independently of the other, 
our manipulations of harm and intent significantly increased feelings of anger, while only the 
manipulation of taboo significantly increased feelings of disgust. Theoretically-relevant 
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appraisals fully accounted for the effects of harm and intent on anger; however, appraisals of 
abnormality did not fully account for the effect of the taboo manipulation on disgust. These 
results support our argument that anger is more likely than disgust to respond to the 
contextual cues of harm and intent.  On the other hand, disgust is uniquely concerned with 
bodily norm violations, and because of this focus on learned associations, persons are fairly 
unresponsive to changes in context.   
A recent study in our lab also shows that moral anger more so than moral disgust is 
likely to respond to changes in circumstances and consequences (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 
2011b). Participants read a scenario that described a moral violation (of either purity norms, 
such as eating a dog, or harm/unfairness norms, such as kicking a dog), which happened in 
two types of settings. Afterwards, they filled out ratings on their moral judgment, anger and 
disgust toward the act. They were then asked to list things that could change their moral 
judgment of the act, and were provided with an opportunity to fill out the emotion and moral 
judgment measures again, imagining that the changes they listed had taken place. We found 
that ratings of disgust did not change after considering potential circumstances, however, 
anger did change, and this result was consistent across the two settings. We also found that 
change in anger but not change in disgust predicted change in moral judgment. This research, 
then, provides evidence that moral disgust may be a more inflexible emotion in comparison 
to moral anger, even when people imagine the consequences and circumstances that would be 
most likely to get them to change their minds overall.  
 Disgust: Inflexibility of Behaviors 
So far the empirical evidence has suggested that moral disgust, in comparison to 
moral anger, is less likely to be associated with situational appraisals and this influences the 
flexibility of anger and disgust. We also believe that disgust and anger differ in the 
complexity of potential behavioral responses that they can elicit. Specifically, disgust has a 
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straightforward behavioral outcome of avoidance because of disgust’s lack of concern for the 
current circumstance. On the other hand, not only is anger more likely to respond to changes 
in context in the first place, but assuming that anger is felt, the behavioral response is likely 
to vary depending on the current circumstance.   
Previous observations indicate that anger is likely to lead to hostile approach 
behaviors and disgust leads to avoidance behaviors. For example, Gutierrez and Giner-
Sorolla (2007) found that anger had more of an effect on the desire to punish than the desire 
to avoid. On the other hand, disgust had a greater influence on the desire to avoid than the 
desire to punish. While generally speaking this distinction is true, we also believe that the 
variability of behaviors associated with anger is greater. 
Numerous studies have highlighted aggression as a common response for anger, with 
individuals choosing to engage in different forms of aggression (Izard, 1977). Anger also 
encourages the person experiencing the emotion to either punish or rebuke verbally the 
person who has done them wrong (Goldberg, Lerner, & Tetlock, 1999; Haidt, 2003; Lerner, 
Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998; Nussbaum, 2004). However, in contrast to this it has sometimes 
been found that anger encourages persons to engage in reparative behaviors, such as talking 
things over (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Weber, 2004). Finally, anger can sometimes lead to 
avoidant responses (Barnes, Brown, & Osterman, 2009; Kuppens et al., 2004). Based on 
these opposing action tendencies, one may question why individuals can respond to their 
anger with such different behaviors.   
As indicated within the previous section, there are specific situational factors that are 
likely to influence the intensity of anger and the behaviors that are likely to occur. Another 
factor that might influence angry behaviors is how socially accountable people feel for their 
response (Averill, 1983). The anger experience is influenced by whether or not people feel 
that their actions will impact others. Thus, when persons feel accountable they will be less 
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likely to respond automatically and thoughtlessly to their anger; if they do, it can have 
extremely negative consequences for themselves and others around them (Izard, 1977). 
Though the impulse may be to attack, strategic considerations can also modify the outcome 
of anger. A more reasoned and sympathetic approach will be less risky and more productive, 
if the target is perceived as amenable to reason. When contemplating an aggressive 
confrontation with a physically or socially stronger person, it may be smarter to avoid the 
person, or perhaps to seek social support from others, than to risk defeat. Anger’s behaviors 
must be viewed in context, as a suitable mechanism of mending the specific problem, even if 
it means breaking contact in the long term (Fischer & Roseman, 2007). This context 
sensitivity in the link from anger to behavior is functionally similar to the greater flexibility 
of appraisal in anger, and the greater ability to speak about reasons for one’s anger. All three 
indicate a more careful and reasoned approach to anger, in line with the greater potential 
costs to the individual and society when it is expressed. 
Although anger can have dangerous consequences by encouraging aggression, its 
strategic nature is further shown when people encourage themselves to experience anger 
because of its instrumental benefits. Tamir, Mitchell, and Gross (2008) have found that 
before individuals engaged in confrontational activities they were more likely to chose to 
engage in activities that would increase their anger. Therefore, these results suggest that 
persons were prepared to experience unpleasant emotions, such as anger, if they anticipated 
instrumental benefits.  Taken together, there are good reasons to have a flexible behavioral 
response to anger, whether limiting the damage from inappropriate expressions of aggressive 
tendencies, or increasing one’s social punching weight through an angry and resolute display. 
Unlike these various action tendencies for anger, disgust is primarily a defensive 
emotion, encouraging individuals who feel disgust to avoid and break off all ties from the 
source of their disgust. Persons normally respond to their disgust with the functionally similar 
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strategies of avoidance and purification (Haidt, 2003). In avoidance someone is motivated to 
either expel or break off contact with the offender (Haidt, 2003). Persons are likely to engage 
in avoidance behaviors when another person or object is the target of disgust. If a person feels 
as if he or she cannot avoid contact with the disgusting object, or has already involuntarily 
come into contact with the disgusting object, purification behaviors are the more likely 
response. When persons purify themselves they are trying to remove any residue of contact 
(Rozin & Nemeroff, 2002). The behavioral tendency of purification is a form of avoidance 
motivated by the need to break off all ties. Of course, if the self becomes metaphorically 
“dirty”, it is impossible to avoid (except by denying the existence of higher standards for the 
self altogether; Baumeister, 1991; Vohs & Baumeister, 2000). In these situations, avoidance 
of the contaminant can only be achieved by purification.  In support of the purity motivation, 
Zhong and Liljenquist (2006) found that individuals who were exposed to their own or 
someone else’s moral transgressions were then more likely to engage in cleansing behaviors. 
In another line of research, Schnall, Benton, and Harvey (2009) found that participants who 
were given the opportunity to wash their hands after being exposed to disgusting stimuli rated 
morally distasteful scenarios as less wrong. Cumulatively, these findings demonstrate that the 
mere knowledge of a disgusting and/or morally wrong scenario may be enough to make 
someone feel contaminated and want to engage in purification behaviors, showing just how 
contagious disgust may be. Also, unlike anger, no research has conclusively shown that 
situational factors can inhibit individuals from engaging in avoidance or purification 
behaviors once they are disgusted. 
In theory, people who feel disgust should seek to establish whether or not this type of 
response is warranted, however, it appears as if the disgust response is often unreasonable. 
For example, it has been argued that persons utilize the disgust reaction because of who a 
person is, not because of what they have done (Haidt, 2003; Nussbaum, 2004). Thus, when 
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disgust is elicited there tends to be less focus on different aspects of the situation, such as 
whether or not a behavior is harmful, instead certain persons are just disgusting. As a result, 
the action tendencies associated with disgust appear to be fairly automatic and do not take 
into account the actions of the individual or group in question. Disgust, then, works to track 
someone’s fairly inflexible status as a stigmatized individual or group member, while moral 
anger is more responsive to momentary concerns about fairness or harm within a relationship 
or group. 
In summary, the research presented within this section suggests that anger’s 
behavioral outcomes are as flexible as its eliciting inputs. Angry behavior is strategic in 
nature and can include verbal or physical attack, seeking of help, and even avoidance, if the 
odds of confrontation are deemed too risky. In contrast, disgust appears to have a 
straightforward behavioral outcome; avoidance and related strategies such as expulsion and 
purification, which is related to the absence of situational appraisals that can modify disgust 
in the first place. To date, no research has directly examined differences in the flexibility 
between disgust and anger provoked behaviors, or within disgust how people respond 
behaviorally to bodily and non-bodily violations. However, we suspect that disgust’s relative 
inflexibility would be most pronounced if disgust were defined in bodily-moral terms.  
Disgust: Lacking External Justifications  
The previous sections indicated that disgust is less responsive to circumstances and 
consequences both in its intensity and behavioral outcome. In extension to the points made in 
previous sections, this section will bring forth the argument that individuals do not normally 
feel that they need to justify their disgust. In support of the unreasoning nature of disgust, we 
have found that disgust is less likely than anger to be justified with external reasons that go 
beyond evaluative responses, and the difference is most pronounced when disgust responds to 
moral violations in the bodily domain (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011c). Therefore, persons 
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are not normally motivated to consider why they feel disgust in the first place, but merely 
rely on their emotion to justify how they feel disgust to others. In the first experiment, 
participants were asked to give reasons for why they felt anger and disgust toward 
pedophiles. We found that individuals were more likely to give cognitively elaborated 
reasons -- ones that go beyond subjective responses -- when justifying their anger in 
comparison to disgust. In fact individuals often gave a tautological response to justify their 
disgust, such as “Pedophiles are disgusting because they are gross”. In contrast, when 
justifying anger participants often provided external reasons, such as “They make me feel 
angry because they abuse the power they have been given”.  
In a second experiment, participants were asked to give reasons for why they felt 
either anger or disgust toward seven groups chosen because some can be seen as violating a 
bodily norm (e.g., pedophiles, prostitutes) while others violate a non-bodily norm (e.g. 
corrupt politicians). Elaborated reasons were used less often when justifying disgust in 
comparison to anger, and this difference was most pronounced when justifying disgust 
toward a group that violates a bodily norm. In the context of bodily-moral disgust participants 
were also most likely to give tautological reasons. These findings not only indicate that 
disgust and anger differ in the type of post-hoc reasons that are given when justifying these 
emotions, but that disgust which arises from non-bodily violations is more similar to anger.  
 We then carried out an additional experiment to see whether this elaborated reasons 
deficit in bodily disgust was due to inability to retrieve reasons, or to reluctance to endorse 
them. Therefore, we manipulated whether or not reasons were available when participants 
were justifying their anger and disgust; elaborated and non-elaborated reasons appropriate to 
both emotions were provided. When reasons were not available our previous findings were 
replicated. However, when reasons were available the difference in reasons no longer 
remained. Therefore, these additional findings suggest that it is not impossible to justify 
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disgust or that persons are unwilling, but that reasons are not normally readily available 
because they are not normally used to justify disgust, particularly in the bodily-moral domain.  
Implications 
We have presented a profile of bodily-moral disgust as an unreasoning emotion, 
because it is inflexible in both thoughts and behaviors, and lacks external justifications. Our 
distinction focusing on bodily-moral disgust should be useful to other researchers who hope 
to study the emotion of disgust in more depth. As we have shown, verbal measures of 
“disgust” may be ambiguous due to the word’s lexical associations with anger, indicating that 
it is necessary to collect additional measures of anger and disgust, such as facial endorsement 
measures. Additionally, disgust may have somewhat different characteristics and 
consequences when judging bodily and non-bodily moral violations. This research may also 
help clarify previous effects. For example, some of the seemingly contradictory findings from 
studies that examined moral disgust might have arisen because of the possible involvement of 
moral anger, or because of differences between bodily and non-bodily violations. Within the 
remainder of this section we will outline some further theoretical and empirical implications 
of our unreasoning disgust hypothesis.    
Dual-process perspective. Our unreasoning disgust hypothesis emphasizes the 
importance of examining moral disgust and anger from a dual-process perspective. The 
differences found between moral anger and disgust suggests that these emotions may be 
associated with different types of cognitive processes. The quality of the cognitive processes 
that are associated with moral anger and disgust reflect distinctions that have been made by 
recent dual-process models. Therefore, based on the distinctions made by these models, it can 
be inferred that disgust is more uniquely reliant on associative processes, while anger is more 
informed by propositional reasoning.  
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For example, Strack and Deutsch (2004) have made comparisons between an 
impulsive and reflective system of processing information, in which the distinct capabilities 
of the reflective system are defined. A capability of the reflective system, according to their 
account, is the ability to process negated statements appropriately. According to Strack and 
Deutsch (2004), successful negation can only occur in the reflective system if there is enough 
“time, intention, and cognitive capacity to extract the meaning of the negation” (p. 227).  If 
one of these conditions is not met then the negated information will be processed in the 
associative system. This ability to respond to negation may be a further consequence of the 
reasons why moral anger and not disgust is modified by the current context. So, when we 
hear about a person who is negatively associated with a morally heinous group and not 
actually part of it (e.g., “Bob Talbert not linked to Mafia”; Wegner, Wenzlaff, Kerker, & 
Beattie, 1981), the reinforcement of the negation might be likely to reduce the amount of 
anger felt. On the other hand, disgust reactions may be less responsive to negations, and more 
likely to proceed on the basis of negativity by association. To date, no research has 
investigated this possibility, but some existing research suggests that things that merely look 
like disgusting objects, such as plastic cockroaches, are avoided in spite of clearly not being 
those things (Rozin, Millman, & Nemeroff, 1986), therefore, it is plausible that disgust may 
also ignore negation.  
Similarly, Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006) have proposed the APE model, in 
order to explain the role of associative and propositional processes in evaluation, clarifying 
why implicit and explicit measures can show differential effects on attitude change. 
Associative processes are defined as the mere activation of concepts independent of truth 
value, which require very little cognitive capacity. In comparison, propositional reasoning 
concerns itself with the validation of beliefs, in which persons make assumptions of truth. 
The APE model assumes that propositional information is superordinate, as a result, 
47 
 
associative information can be turned into propositional format. However, when these 
propositional statements are made they are subject to inferences of truth value. Individuals 
must then have the capacity and motivation to engage in a validation process and not merely 
rely on their associations.  
By applying this model, it can be inferred that moral anger may go one step further 
than disgust, requiring further propositions that are dependent on truth value. This reliance on 
further propositions is reflected in the type of justifications that are typically required for 
anger in comparison to disgust (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011c). The findings also suggest 
that there is a tendency for individuals who feel disgust to merely rely on associative 
processes, especially in the context of a bodily norm violation. One of the implications of 
propositional processing, for example, is that we care about the consistency of propositions 
but not about associations (Gawronski & Strack, 2004). Perhaps, then, if two social objects 
are opposed to each other – say, a criminal and the victim – negative evaluation of the 
criminal based on anger will reduce the anger felt toward the other party. On the other hand, 
negative evaluations based on bodily disgust toward the criminal will not be as inconsistent 
with disgust toward the victim, and may in fact ironically spread to the victim based on the 
principle of contagion. Prior research has indicated that core disgust can spread associatively 
(e.g., Moralez & Fitszimons, 2007; Rozin, Millman, & Nemeroff, 1986), and that moral 
disgust, but not moral anger, persists despite changes in context (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 
2011a b). Additionally, the stigma by association effect, which demonstrates that individuals 
are negatively evaluated because of prior contact with stigmatized individuals, has been 
found towards groups of individuals that have been related with disgust, such as obese 
individuals (Hebl & Mannix, 2003) and homosexuals (Neuberg, Smith, Hoffman ,&  F.J. 
Russell, 1994), however, to our knowledge this effect has not been shown towards groups of 
individuals that primarily elicit anger, such as crooked politicians. Thus, it would be useful if 
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future research investigates whether disgust, rather than anger, can spread by contagion in 
interpersonal contexts.  
A third dual-process perspective specifically relevant to emotional appraisals was 
proposed by Moors (2010), distinguishing between automatic appraisals that are constructive 
and non-constructive. The research Moors presents in support of these ideas is mostly 
relevant to evaluation and attitudes, but has implications for more specific emotions. Non-
constructive appraisals, in this view, are those that activate a prior association between a 
stimulus and an evaluation; constructive appraisals combine a stimulus with a representation 
of a goal, resulting in an evaluation of the stimulus in light of its ability to help or harm 
attainment of that goal. Moors’ research, and other work (e.g., Ferguson & Bargh, 2004) 
shows that evaluation informed by goals can also be automatic. The prevalence of irrational, 
superficial elicitors of disgust could thus mean that it is produced primarily from non-
constructive appraisals of the environment – for things that look disgusting, regardless of the 
context or current goal. Anger, as an emotion sensitive to more abstract concepts, might be 
more flexible and responsive to current goal concerns. At the same time, the automaticity of 
goal-driven and goal-independent appraisals may explain why disgust and anger each seem to 
appear automatically in moral situations (for example, in Gutierrez and Giner-Sorolla, 2007, 
cognitive load did not reduce the amount of anger or disgust felt when reading moral 
scenarios).   
Examining emotion inferences. The relationship between anger and disgust and 
situational appraisals can have implications for the inferences that are likely to be made when 
moral disgust versus moral anger is elicited. Since disgust is associated with concrete 
elicitors, it is likely to lead to dispositional inferences being made because the focus is on the 
object and not the event or agent. On the other hand, anger and other expressions of moral 
condemnation, mainly toward non-bodily violations, are more likely to lead to both 
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dispositional and situational inferences. With anger, there is more focus on what the target 
has done, and the context in which the behavior has occurred.   
Although to date there is no direct evidence to support this assumption, previous 
social psychological research suggests that disgust is likely to lead to dispositional but not 
situational inferences being made. For example, Weiner (1980) has found that when a 
person’s behavior is attributed to internal problems that they should control, such as a drunk 
that lacks self-control, this is likely to elicit feelings of disgust.  On the other hand, when a 
behavior is attributed to external factors or that the individual should not be held responsible 
for their actions, such as a disabled person, this is likely to elicit feelings of sympathy. Also, 
Harris and Fiske (2006) have examined extreme outgroups as objects of dehumanization. 
Specifically, they predicted that groups that, according to the Stereotype Content Model, are 
perceived as being low in both competence and warmth (e.g., drug addicts and homeless 
people) are subjected to this extreme prejudice, which was supported through neurological 
imaging.  Groups in the low-low quadrant of the model did not activate the medial prefrontal 
cortex, which is essential for social cognition, while groups that belonged to the other three 
quadrants – that is, were seen as having at least one set of socially valued traits - did activate 
this area. However, the insula and amygdala, which are two parts of the brain that are related 
to feelings of disgust, were activated in reaction to groups from the low-low quadrant. This 
research suggests that groups which elicit disgust are more likely to be viewed as objects or 
creatures than as human beings that have complex thoughts and feelings adapted to different 
situations. Future research would benefit from a stricter distinction and simultaneous 
measurement of anger versus disgust.  
Changing emotions of moral condemnation. Because disgust is more likely to be 
based on learned associations, and situational appraisals are not likely to reverse feelings of 
disgust, this suggests that disgust toward an object can only be changed through habituation 
50 
 
and learning of new associations. Researchers have suggested that both moral and non-moral 
forms of disgust can be learned associatively (e.g., Angyal, 1941; Rozin et al., 1993) and 
recent research shows that physical disgust can be unlearned by familiarization with the 
disgusting object, for example, when a medical student grows accustomed to working with 
cadavers (Rozin, 2008). However, because moral disgust also involves a moral categorization 
in the form of a deontological rule (“incest is disgusting” coexisting with “incest is wrong”), 
it may be necessary both to change the emotional association and to indicate that the 
deontological rule is unfounded. For example, some individuals not only find homosexual 
behaviors to be disgusting, but they also believe these behaviors are wrong, and these beliefs 
may be embedded in a network of religious and conservative values and identities (see 
Olatunji, 2008). Therefore, in order to change these opinions, people may have to go through 
a lengthy process in which not just the emotional association but also the moral beliefs are 
changed.  
Also, as indicated by Rozin’s (2008) research on physical disgust, the unlearning 
process is very specific. Medical students growing accustomed to the clammy feel of 
cadavers did not become less disgust sensitive towards other things in general. Thus, applied 
to the moral realm, changing disgust toward one sexual norm (e.g., same-sex relations) might 
not make it more likely that disgust would be diminished in other domains, as demonstrated 
by changes in legislation toward various sexual behaviors (Cahill, 2005). For example, 
attitudes toward same-sex relations have become more favorable throughout history. At the 
same time, this domain shows just how hard it is to change certain attitudes; persons’ general 
opinions have changed, but some individuals still find it difficult to overcome their negative 
evaluations toward same-sex marriage and adoption. For example, according to the General 
Social Survey (GSS) in the 1970s about 66.7% of Americans thought that homosexual 
behaviors were always wrong compared to about 56 % in the 1990’s (Herek, 2000). 
51 
 
However, Yang (1997) has found, based on a comprehensive review of surveys that are 
intended to monitor social change in the United States (such as Gallup polls, GSS, and 
National Election Studies conducted in the 1970s through 1990s), that even though many 
individuals opposed discrimination toward gay people, the national surveys indicated that 
some individuals also thought that gay people should not be given the right to adopt children. 
For example, various opinion polls regarding anti-gay attitudes revealed that 63-79% of 
people thought that homosexual couples should not be legally permitted to adopt children, 
while 57-60% of people thought that homosexuals should receive equal opportunities in 
terms of housing and job opportunities. Also, improvement in attitudes toward same-sex 
relations has not brought a generally liberal attitude toward other sexual minorities such as 
transgender people (see Calhill, 2005 for a review on relationships between different sexual 
taboos, including implications to general public opinions and law). Previous research has also 
found that disgust is associated with same-sex relations, and other non-normative sexual 
behaviors (e.g., Haidt & Hersh, 2001; Haidt et al., 1994; Olatunji, 2008). For example, 
Olatunji (2008) found a significant relationship between core disgust and negative attitudes 
towards homosexuals. Additionally, it was found that conservative attitudes towards sex 
partially mediated this relationship. Therefore, reflecting Haidt and Hersh’s (2001) original 
finding that conservatives are more likely to morally condemn and express disgust toward 
various sexual behaviors, such as homosexual relations, incest, and abnormal masturbation. 
Based on these findings, there seems to be a common ground that may be behind the fashion 
by which these sexual attitudes are changed. It seems as if feelings of disgust will need to be 
tackled in different sexual domains separately and will most likely take a lot of effort and 
time.  
For attitudes based on anger, though, arguments based on more abstract and flexible 
appraisals such as harm, intentionality and responsibility may be able to have some impact. 
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For example, Goldberg, Lerner, and Tetlock (1999) have found that cues of justice being 
served minimized feelings of anger and diminished anger’s carry-over effects. Thus, focusing 
on evidence that harm was undone or avenged would decrease an individual’s anger. Also, 
arguments based on anger’s initial flexible appraisals, as demonstrated in Russell and Giner-
Sorolla (2011a b), might also have success in lowering anger – showing, for example, that a 
person did not commit a crime intentionally, did not actually harm anyone, or was justified in 
doing what he or she did. Ironically, though, the reasoned nature of anger may also make an 
initial angry attitude more difficult to change. Showing biased reasoning, people are 
motivated to generate reasons and judgments relevant to blame that retroactively justify their 
own anger (Alicke, 2000; Ask & Granhag, 2007; Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993; 
Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998; Tetlock et al., 2007). Sometimes this takes the form of a 
presumption of harm. For example, people who believe in the wrongness of a victimless 
crime – a consensual or solo sexual act, or the eating of a cloned meat product that 
technically constitutes cannibalism – also believe it harms other people by violating their 
rights, even when harm to others is excluded by the description of the scenario (Björklund, 
Haidt, & Murphy, 2000; Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007; Haidt & Hersh, 2001).  
Gutierrez and Giner-Sorolla (2007) also established that this presumption of harm was 
posterior to anger and moral judgments. Specifically, the last two studies varied the amount 
of cognitive load participants experienced by having them memorize a complex versus simple 
number. It was found that load reduced the presumption of harm, but not anger or moral 
judgment. This showed that inferences about harm were more cognitively complex and less 
immediate than either emotions or judgments, making it unlikely that harm inferences were 
precursors to emotions and judgments. Thus, disgust and anger each seem to resist change in 
their characteristic way; disgust by outright defying reasoned thought, and anger by 
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subverting and biasing it. The implications about how, for example, prejudices based on 
disgust and anger may be fruitfully changed await further investigations. 
Applied settings. This research also provides empirical evidence for Nussbaum’s 
(2004) claim that disgust, more so than anger, has an unreasonable influence in judgments of 
law and justice. Anger, but not disgust, responds to two important cues that are essential to 
law and justice - whether or not one’s actions are harmful and whether or not one’s actions 
are intentional (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011a). On the other hand, disgust as an 
unreasonable emotion, is mainly concerned with previously learned norms regarding the 
body. Therefore, disgust has the ability to bias people’s judgments in a way that is insensitive 
to important details of the case, such as whether the perpetrator’s actions were intentional.  
Our findings provide initial evidence that disgust has the ability to prejudice moral and legal 
judgments inappropriately, while being unresponsive to the kind of considerations that would 
make it appropriate. Policy makers and professionals involved in criminal trials should then 
question whether disgust should play a role in legal judgments, on a general philosophical 
level (cf. the exchange between Kahan, 2000 and Nussbaum, 2000). While anger may also 
contribute biasing effects to judgments, as we have argued here and elsewhere (Giner-Sorolla 
& Russell, 2009), legal scholars have also noted that anger may be an appropriate response 
during the legal process, as long as it is subservient to fair procedures and standards. The 
unthinking emotion of disgust, we believe, has a harder time complying with these 
requirements. 
These considerations have a more specific and concrete impact when considering the 
prejudicial impact of various aspects of trial evidence. For example, whether or not extremely 
gory photographs of a crime scene should be shown is an issue still debated in law (see 
Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2000 and Cush & Delahunty, 2006, for impact of emotionally 
charged photographs in criminal trials). To the extent that these effects are based on the 
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emotion of disgust at the gore, rather than anger at the injustice done, they are likely to be 
harmful rather than helpful in making sure justice is served. Indeed, because anger can be 
brought out by a narrative, it is hard to see what additional horrifying evidence would 
contribute to the moral anger, as opposed to disgust, that would motivate a fitting 
punishment. As with the IAPS picture stimuli, anger, unlike disgust, responds only 
inconsistently to pictures, which can also arouse other emotions. Future research would also 
benefit from examining if disgust also has an unreasonable influence in other areas, e.g., 
opinions about food and medicine.  
Conclusion 
We have provided a definition of what moral disgust is and identified that it is 
necessary to distinguish between bodily and non-bodily violations when examining emotions 
of moral condemnation. We also presented our unreasoning disgust hypothesis, which 
indicated unique features of moral disgust as distinct from anger.  First, moral disgust is less 
associated with situational appraisals in comparison to moral anger, and is more likely to be 
based on associative learning. Second, moral disgust has less flexible and expressive 
cognitive consequences in contrast to moral anger. Third, disgust has a straightforward 
behavioral consequence, avoidance, because of the thought processes that are associated with 
this emotion. On the other hand, anger shows more variability in its behavioral outcomes.  
Fourth, disgust is less likely to be justified with external reasons than anger. Ironically, even 
though disgust is developmentally learned at a relatively late age compared to other basic 
emotions such as anger, fear or happiness, its influence on moral judgment seems to be basic, 
unreasoning, and inflexible. Ultimately, what disgusts us conditions our moral judgments in 
ways that reason cannot know. 
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Table 1 
Research in support of each of four positions about the nature of moral disgust: Presenting studies that Manipulate and/or Measure State 
Disgust towards Moral Violations 
Publication Findings 
support 
Summary of Findings Sample 
Size 
Emotion 
manipulations 
and/or measures 
Anger and 
disgust? 
Moral violations used Bodily 
versus non-
bodily 
violations? 
Non-bodily 
purity 
violations? 
 
Gutierrez 
and Giner-
Sorolla 
(2007) 
 
Bodily 
 
Non-bodily moral violation 
increased anger controlling for 
disgust.  
 
Bodily moral violation 
increased disgust controlling 
for anger. 
 
Study 1:  
N  = 94 
 
Study 2:  
N = 194 
 
Study 3:  
N = 109 
 
 
Self-report emotion 
face items:  How 
much they feel 
emotion depicted by 
photograph of facial 
expression 
 
Self-report emotion 
word items: How 
much they feel 
emotion terms (e.g., 
anger, disgust)  
 
Yes 
 
Scenarios describing 
immoral behavior 
manipulated to present 
different bodily (e.g., 
non-normative eating 
behaviors) and non-
bodily (e.g., harm to 
others) moral 
violations.  
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
 
 
Simpson, 
Carter, 
Anthony, and 
Overton 
(2006) 
 
Bodily 
 
Non-bodily moral disgust 
shared variance with anger.  
 
Core disgust shared variance 
with fear.  
 
Found differences in how core 
and non-bodily moral disgust 
changed over time.  
 
 
N = 42 
 
Self-report emotion 
word items: How 
much they feel 
emotion terms (e.g., 
anger, disgust)  
 
Yes 
 
 
Photographs depicting 
non-bodily moral 
violations (e.g., 
deception) 
Compared to 
photographs evoking 
core disgust (e.g., 
bodily waste) 
 
 
 
No 
 
No 
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Schaich Borg, 
Lieberman, 
and Kiehl 
(2008) 
 
Bodily 
 
Distinct regions for core 
disgust and socio-moral disgust 
(including both bodily and 
non-bodily violations).  
 
Distinct regions for bodily and 
non-bodily moral disgust.  
 
N = 50 
 
Brain imaging to 
measure activation 
of disgust 
 
No 
 
 
Statements describing 
bodily (e.g., non-
normative sexual 
behaviors) and non-
bodily (e.g., harmful 
behaviors) moral 
violations  
Compared to core 
disgust and neutral 
statements 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
 
Royzman, 
Leeman, and 
Sabini (2008) 
Bodily Vignettes describing bodily 
moral violation elicited 
physical repulsion and disgust, 
however, non-bodily moral 
violation did not.  
Pilot 
Study: 
N = 15 
 
Study 1:  
N = 85 
 
Study 2:  
N = 232 
Self-report 
likelihood of 
experiencing bodily 
sensations (e.g., 
nausea and gagging) 
 
Self-report disgust 
word items:  How 
much they feel 
disgust 
 
Behavioral 
tendencies (e.g., 
avoidance, lash out) 
No Pilot study: 
Photographs depicting 
non-bodily, photo of 
Hitler, and bodily, 
incest, moral violations  
Compared to 
photographs evoking 
core disgust 
 
Study 1 and 2: 
Vignettes described 
bodily moral violation 
(incest)  
Compared to neutral 
behaviors  
Yes No 
 
 
 
Hutcherson 
and Gross 
(2011) 
 
General 
 
Found that moral disgust was 
the dominant response across 
the CAD domains, thus, both 
 
Study 1:  
N = 151 
 
 
Self-report emotion 
word items: How 
much they feel 
 
Yes 
 
 
Scenarios describing 
bodily (purity/divinity) 
and non-bodily 
 
Yes 
 
No 
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bodily and non-bodily moral 
violations.  
Study 2:  
N = 131 
 
Study 3:  
N = 106 
 
Study 4:  
N = 46 
 
Study 5:  
N = 30 
emotion terms (e.g., 
anger, disgust) but 
only “moral disgust” 
and “grossed out” 
(not “disgust” by 
itself or “moral” 
added to other 
emotion terms).  
 
(community, autonomy) 
moral violations  
 
Jones and 
Fitness 
(2008), Study 
1 
 
General 
 
Heightened accessibility of 
disgust and washing related 
words after reading about non-
bodily moral violations.  
 
Study 1:  
N = 40 
 
Completed word 
fragments 
containing disgust 
and washing related 
words 
 
No 
 
Vignettes describing 
non-bodily moral 
violations (despicable 
criminal behaviors) 
Compared to neutral 
behaviors 
 
No 
 
No 
 
 
Chapman, 
Kin, Susskind 
and Anderson 
(2009) 
 
General 
 
Found evidence of disgust 
facial expression in response to 
distaste, core disgust, and non-
bodily moral violation.  
 
N = 18 
 
Coding of 
participants’ disgust 
facial expression  
 
Self-report emotion 
face items:  How 
much they feel 
emotion depicted by 
photograph of facial 
expression 
 
No 
 
Engaged in ultimatum 
game (presented non-
bodily moral violation 
due to situation of 
unfairness in game). 
 
 
No 
 
No 
 
 
 
Wheatley and 
Haidt (2005) 
 
General 
 
Found that disgust induced by 
hypnosis made moral 
 
Study 1:  
N = 64 
 
Disgust manipulated 
by hypnotic 
 
No 
 
 
Scenarios describing 
bodily and non-bodily 
 
Yes 
 
No 
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judgments more severe.   
Study 2:  
N = 94 
induction from 
trigger words 
Compared to neutral 
condition 
 
Self-report disgust 
word items: How 
much they feel 
disgust.  
moral violations.  
 
 
Schnall, 
Haidt, Clore, 
and Jordan 
(2008) 
 
General 
 
Found that manipulations of 
disgust made moral judgments 
more severe. 
 
Study 1:  
N = 127 
 
Study 2:  
N = 43 
 
Study 3:  
N = 69 
 
Study 4:  
N = 133 
 
Disgust manipulated 
via incidental 
environmental cues, 
recall, or videos 
Compared to  
neutral condition 
and/or sadness 
manipulation 
 
Manipulation check 
for how much they 
feel disgust 
 
 
No 
 
Scenarios describing 
bodily and non-bodily 
moral violations.  
 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
 
 
Danovitch 
and Bloom 
(2009) 
 
General 
 
Children labeled a range of 
moral violations as disgusting 
using disgust word and disgust 
face measures.  
 
Study 1:  
N = 60 
 
Study 2: 
N = 56 
 
Study 3:  
N = 51 
 
Study 1 and 2: 
Children responded 
to the question “Is 
this disgusting?” 
(yes/no response) 
 
Study 3:  Children 
were asked does the 
 
No 
 
Stories describing non-
bodily moral violations 
(e.g., cheating). 
Compared to elicitors 
of core disgust; actions 
that are physical but 
non-disgusting, and 
actions that are bad but 
 
No 
 
No 
 
 
74 
 
 disgust face go with 
the story 
 
not immoral 
 
Eskine, 
Kacinik, and 
Prinz (2011) 
General Exposure to bitter drink made 
bodily and non-bodily moral 
judgments more severe.  
N= 57 Disgust manipulated 
by ingestion of bitter 
drink  
Compared to neutral 
condition and sweet 
manipulation 
 
Manipulation check 
for how much they 
feel disgust 
 
No 
 
Scenarios describing 
bodily and non-bodily 
moral violations 
Yes No 
 
 
Nabi (2002) Metaphor The trigger words of disgust 
and disgusted were associated 
with anger themes.  
The word grossed-out was 
associated with disgust 
themes.  
N = 140 Emotion terms (e.g., 
“angry,” 
“disgusted,” 
“grossed-out”) used 
as triggers for 
statements  
Yes Coding of participant 
statements as involving 
anger (e.g., unfair 
treatment) or disgust 
(e.g., inappropriate 
sexual acts, bodily 
waste) themes 
No No 
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Rozin, 
Lowery, 
Imada, and 
Haidt (1999) 
Purity Bodily purity violations were 
described as disgusting.  
Study 1:  
N = 384 
 
Study 2: 
N=136 
 
Study 3: 
N=21 
 
Study 4 
N=20 
 
Self-report emotion 
face items:  How 
much they feel 
emotion depicted by  
photograph of facial 
expression 
 
Self-report emotion 
word items: How 
much they feel 
emotion terms (e.g., 
anger, disgust) 
Yes Scenarios describing 
bodily (purity/divinity) 
and non-bodily 
(community, autonomy) 
moral violations 
Yes No 
 
 
 
Horberg, 
Oveis, 
Keltner, and 
Cohen (2009) 
 
Purity 
 
Disgust heightened moral 
judgments of purity violations.  
However, disgust towards non-
bodily purity violations was 
not measured, only moral 
judgment.  
 
Study 1:  
N = 96 
 
Study 2:  
N =122 
 
 
Study 1: 
Self-report emotion 
word items: How 
much they feel 
emotion terms (e.g., 
anger, disgust) 
 
Study 2: Disgust 
manipulated via 
videos compared to 
sadness 
manipulation  
 
Manipulation check 
for how much they 
feel disgust 
 
Study 1:Yes 
Study 2: No 
 
Study 1: Scenarios that 
described purity 
violations (bodily only) 
or justice violations 
 
Study 2: Scenarios that 
described purity virtues 
and violations (both 
bodily and non-bodily) 
or harm/care virtues 
and violations.  
 
Yes  
(Study 1-2) 
 
 
Study 1: No 
Study 2:Yes 
 
 
         
Note. This table summarizes research originally presented in support of each of four positions about the nature of moral disgust. Bodily = bodily 
moral position that disgust responds to bodily-moral violations (such as non-normative eating and sexual behaviors); General = general morality 
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position that disgust responds to all negative moral judgments, including both bodily and non-bodily violations (such as harm to others, 
unfairness, and cheating behaviors) ; Metaphor = metaphorical use position that reported moral disgust is actually a metaphor for anger; Purity = 
purity position that disgust responds to contamination threats to the body and/or soul.  
 
We outline whether research in support of each position satisfies three criteria as tests of the role of disgust in moral condemnation: “Anger and 
disgust”: Whether state anger and disgust were both directly measured (necessary for distinguishing moral anger from moral disgust). “Bodily 
versus non-bodily violations”:  Whether there were manipulations or scenarios that involved bodily moral violations and non-bodily moral 
violations, comparing responses to the different types of violations (necessary for distinguishing the general position from the bodily-moral 
position)   “Non-bodily purity violations”: Whether there were manipulations or scenarios that involved a non-bodily purity violation (necessary 
for distinguishing the purity position from the bodily-moral position).  
 
 
